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Kathleen M.H. Wallman*
I. INTRODUCTION: IS THERE STILL A
ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT IN STANDARD-
SETTING?
Two trends are dominant in telecommunica-
tions at the moment. The first is the convergence
of networks to form a network of networks;1 the
second is convergence among proprietary net-
work concepts and technologies to form publicly
accessible networks. Both trends depend upon
the reliable and timely development of standards.
Without standards ensuring interoperability of di-
verse technologies, the benefits of network effects,
which make networks increasingly valuable in di-
rect proportion to the number of users, will be di-
verted and in some cases, never realized or distrib-
uted.
Part I of this essay frames the question of
whether governments have a useful role to play in
standard-setting and explains why this question is
relevant and important. Part II examines the con-
tinuing role of standards in the modern telecom-
munications economy and why standards are im-
portant. Part III examines the current ways
telecommunications standards are set and
deployed, including analysis of what works well
and what needs improvement. Part IV establishes
a framework for analyzing government's role in
standard-setting and examines five examples of
places where governmental entities elected to in-
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tervene or not to intervene. Part V summarizes
the characteristics indicating whether a particular
standard-setting situation is a good or bad candi-
date for government involvement.
The standard-setting field is abundantly popu-
lated with individual companies, trade associa-
tions, professional associations, consortia and
others playing prominent roles.2 Governments
also have a role of their own as parties to such
treaty organizations as the International Telecom-
munications Union, an arm of the United Na-
tions. They also work through officially sanc-
tioned delegates, such as the American National
Standards Institute's participation in the Interna-
tional Standards Organization. But are govern-
ments operating in their sovereign capacities in-
dispensable to this process or should this role be
relinquished to the private sector?
As developed below, the answer depends on the
circumstances. The problem is identifying which
type of situation is best handled by government,
and which is best left to the private sector. It is
important to view past experiences in order to
identify potential future inefficiencies in the allo-
cation of resources. Specifically, if the private sec-
tor can do the job better or at least as well, there
is no reason to divert government resources away
from functions that government alone is qualified
or empowered to do. For example, there is no
tions, George Mason University, 2000), also of Wallman Stra-
tegic Consulting, LLC, who contributed to this article.
1 The development of seamless connections among wire-
less networks in the U.S. and the connection of those net-
works to the wireline network are examples of this trend. It
has become commonplace for a caller to originate calls on
one network that terminate on another. The calling party
often is indifferent to whether his or her calls terminate on a
wireless or wireline network.
2 See HARRY NEWrON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY
742 (15th ed. 1999) (identifying over 100 private and public
entities involved in standard-setting in the telecommunica-
tions area).
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reason to direct government resources away from
enforcement functions and into those standard-
setting activities.
A companion question is whether there is con-
tinued utility in the organized standard-setting
process in light of the advent of de facto stan-
dards. In other words, is it inappropriate to allow
individual companies, or consortia of companies,
to set standards that respond to market demand,
particularly when there is evidence that the mar-
ket process is swifter and more timely than organ-
ized processes or government action?
Here again, as developed below, there may be
extremely important benefits to an organized pro-
cess that is not controlled, at least ostensibly, by
an individual company or companies. The bene-
fits may include greater international propagation
and acceptance of compatibilities based on stan-
dards and greater openness to competitive "un-
derdogs." Nevertheless, it would be beneficial
from a resource allocation perspective to be able
to predict whether a particular standard-setting
situation is better handled by the resources of a
standard-setting body or should instead be com-
mitted to de facto standard-setting.
Another critical question to address is whether,
even if government standard-setting is slower, less
efficient or less responsive to immediate market
demands, it is or can be "fairer" in the sense that
it is more inclusive, more open to minority views,
or protective of minority interests or potential
competition from those not yet involved in the
specific market. Additionally, government stan-
dard-setting may be more responsive to public in-
terest ideals. These factors must also be included
in any analysis that seeks to discover when govern-
ment resources, as opposed to private sector re-
sources, are warranted.
II. THE CONTINUING AND RENEWED
IMPORTANCE OF STANDARDS
Standards have always been important referents
in industry, even as the subject matter of the stan-
dard-setting process has become more complex.
For example, the process for setting standards
3 See Mark. A. Lernley, Standardizing Government Standard-
Setting Policy for Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J.
745, 745-46 n.3 (1999) (citing WILLIAMJ. CLINTON & ALBERT
A. GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC COM-
MERCE (1997) <www.ecommerce.gov/framework.htm> [here-
inafter CLINTON & GORE]).
governing pipefittings would be relatively accessi-
ble and straightforward. The interested parties
and those affected by the decision would be rela-
tively easy to identify; the alternatives would be
relatively few; and the consequences of one
choice over another would be reasonably foresee-
able. By contrast, the process by which knowledge-
able people arrive at the standards that govern
how cable modems work in a network configura-
tion is more complex. The downstream conse-
quences of a standards-setting process on cable
modems are potentially uncontainable. They af-
fect not only the cable business, but also the busi-
ness of delivering telephony and data services,
and possibly the over-the-air broadcast business.
The level of technical expertise needed simply to
understand the available choices is considerable.
The importance of standards is also increasing,
owing to the networked nature of telecommunica-
tions and information technology innovations.
Standards are needed not only to coordinate out-
comes but also to ensure the interoperability of
the infrastructure.3 This underscores the need for
compatibility standards as opposed to merely co-
ordinative standards. Coordinative standards-
such as a declared standard for railway track
gauge agreed upon after a prevailing standard has
propagated in the market-serve the purpose of
informing new manufacturers or suppliers to the
market and thereby encourage future conver-
gence of competing standards.4 Compliance is
not mandatory but may be viewed as a conve-
nience for new manufacturers. These new manu-
facturers are equally free, however, to divert from
the standard to employ a more technically ad-
vanced standard or for tactical reasons, to imple-
ment a new business plan.5 Telecommunications
and information technology systems, by contrast,
demand compatibility with respect to signaling
systems and conventions, conversion protocols
and modulation in order to work end-to-end. 6 Al-
though paradigm shifts, such as the shift toward
internet protocol ("IP"), are still possible, it is im-
portant that deployed standards be mandatory
rules.7
Precisely because these choices matter so much
4 See SUSANNE K. SCHMIDT & RAYMOND WERLE; COORDI-
NATING TECHNOLOGY: STUDIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL STAND-
ARDIZATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 34, 41 (1998).
5 See id. at 34.
6 See id.
7 See id at 34-35.
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in an economy that is dependent upon informa-
tion technology, renewed attention is being cast
on the standard-setting process. The stakes are
high not only in the United States for U.S. compa-
nies and users, but globally as well. The compati-
bility of U.S. standards with those adopted in
other countries can make or break U.S. entry into
foreign markets, and can make or break the via-
bility of foreign competitors in U.S. markets and
abroad.
First, it is important to understand exactly what
a standard is. "Standard" is defined as a "[g] uide-
line documentation that reflects agreements on
products, practices, or operations by nationally or
internationally recognized industrial, profes-
sional, trade associations or governmental bod-
ies."8 Thus, standards may address a variety of ar-
eas, including interference prevention, interoper
ability, and service or product quality. Interest-
ingly, this definition is accompanied in the text by
the following annotation: "Note: This concept ap-
plies to formal, approved standards, as contrasted
to de facto standards and proprietary standards,
which are exceptions to this concept."9 So even in
figuring out what this catch-all term "standard"
means, experts are constrained to acknowledge
that a process that aims to be organized, hierar-
chical and consensus-based often is not. And the
reason for the need to acknowledge this excep-
tion that often is the rule underscores what many
participants in the standard-setting process and
users of standards have figured out by experience:
control the standard and be the master of your
own success.
Thus, the question of who should set telecom-
munications standards matters very much to a lot
of people. The answer to that question posed in
the present tense-"Who sets telecommunica-
tions standards?"-is the classic hedging re-
sponse: "It depends." There are many partici-
pants.
In some cases, dominant industry participants
set the standard de facto. The emergence of the
Microsoft Windows operating system as the fa-
8 National Communications System Technology & Stan-
dards Division, Telecommunications: Glossary of Telecommunica-
tion Terms (last modified Aug. 23, 1996) <www.its.bldrdoc.
gov/fs-1037/>.
9 Id.
10 See GEOFFREY A. MOORE ET AL., THE GORILLA GAME
10-11 (rev. ed. 1999)
I I See id.
vored desktop operating system is an example of
de facto standard-setting. 10 In fact, the skill of cap-
turing enduring market share and thereby achiev-
ing commercial success by promulgating de facto
standards, is touted as a key criterion that inves-
tors should seek and evaluate in candidates for
their portfolio. 1
One key to success is to establish control over a
proprietary architecture in a particular value
chain. The preferable architecture for this strat-
egy also is open and exhibits high switching costs.
An architecture can be both proprietary and
open, even though this sounds a bit counterintui-
tive. It is proprietary when it is developed as the
intellectual property of an enterprise; and made
open when the proprietor publishes enough in-
formation about the architecture and its inter-
faces to allow other companies to build products,
write applications, create services or otherwise
add value that interoperates with the proprietor's
product. By building dependency on the architec-
ture and everything that relies upon it, the origi-
nal proprietor makes itself indispensable to users
who do not want to endure the headaches and ex-
pense of trying something else-hence, high
switching costs.
In some cases, the industry that will be using
the standard sets the standard. The cable modem
standard, known as Data Over Cable Service Inter-
face Specifications ("DOCSIS"), is an example of
a standard promulgated in this fashion. 2 DOCSIS
was originated by the Multimedia Cable Network
System ("MCNS"), which initially was comprised
of Comcast, Cox, TCI (now AT&T), Time Warner
and CableLabs. 13 CableLabs then administered
DOCSIS testing and the certification of vendor
equipment for compliance with DOCSIS require-
ments and interoperability.14
In some cases, a group of companies or indus-
tries mutually interested in and affected by a pro-
posed standard will act collectively to arrive at a
standard, usually under the auspices of a recog-
nized standard-setting group, such as the Tele-
communications Industry Association ("TIA").' 5
12 See Cable Modem Standards and Specifications (visited
Mar. 30, 2000) <www.cabledatacomnews.com/cmic/cmic3.
html>.
13 See id.
14 See id.
15 See, e.g., TIA Standards Development (visited Nov. 23,
1999) <www.csrstds.com/stddev.html>.
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Participation in such a group is an important pro-
tection against antitrust liability, provided the
group follows procedures designed to ensure due
process is observed and that the procedures will
not be perverted to serve the anticompetitive aim
of excluding competitors from a given field.1 6
Such procedures are themselves standardized, to
some degree, under the supervision of the Ameri-
can National Standards Institute ("ANSI"), which
functions as a nonprofit member organization
that is supported by private and public sectors.1 7
ANSI does not create or develop standards; it
views, and if appropriate, approves the work of ac-
credited developers who submit possible future
standards on a voluntary basis.' 8
In other cases, companies work outside the es-
tablished standard-setting organizations in con-
sortia to form standards. An example of this ap-
proach is the Bluetooth consortium, a group of
companies that has formed a "Special Interest
Group" around the project of developing stan-
dards for wireless connectivity for communica-
tions appliances. ' 9
Occasionally, standard-setting work is under-
taken by voluntary, private groups established for
the purpose of collaborating on a specific type of
standard. The Internet Engineering Task Force
("IETF"), the standard-setting arm of the Internet
Society, is an example of a private standard-setting
group. Founded in 1992, the Internet Society's
members stepped forward to stimulate coordina-
tion of technical standards that enabled the
growth and promotion of the internet.20 Because
internet standard-setting work did not fall clearly
into the responsibility of any existing organiza-
tion, the IETF initially competed with the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union ("ITU"). How-
ever, these groups eventually agreed to work
together on emerging technology standards. 2'
In yet other cases, the federal government, act-
16 See id. (summarizing TIA balloting procedures for in-
terested parties).
17 See id. See also An Introduction to ANSI (visited Mar. 31,
2000) <web.ansi.org/public/about.html>.
I8 See id.
19 See Bluetooth Special Interest Group (visited Apr. 1, 2000)
<www.bluetooth.com>.
20 See All About the internet Society (visited Apr. 1, 2000)
<www.isoc.org/isoc/>.
21 See Sandra Gittlen, IE7 and ITU End Rivalry, Join on
Convergence Standards (visited Apr. 1, 2000) <www.nwfusion.
com/news/1999/0715ietf.html>; Joe McGarvey & Peter
Judge, IT Week: IETF and ITU Find Common Ground (visited
ing on its own or in concert with other national
governments or industry members, essentially
takes over the standard-setting process. Some-
times the government convenes a federal advisory
committee for the purpose of obtaining organ-
ized industry and user input, as it did in the case
of standards for digital television.22 Government
standard-setting has fallen somewhat out of favor
in recent years in the United States, with the Clin-
ton administration promulgating a stated policy
against government intervention in standard-set-
ting.2 3
Often, the nature of government involvement is
blurred. The ITU operates with heavy de facto in-
put from member countries' industries and their
trade associations.2 4 In 1994, the Kyoto Plenipo-
tentiary Conference of the ITU gave formal recog-
nition to the role that private parties long had
played and accorded them certain rights and priv-
ileges.25 Hundreds of service providers, equip-
ment manufacturers and user groups now for-
mally participate in the work of the ITU. 26
With so many interested industry players, trade
associations and voluntary associations ready, will-
ing and able to help set standards or take over the
process altogether, and with the prevailing bias
against government involvement in standard-set-
ting, it is important to ask what role government
legitimately should have in this space. The reality
is that despite the stated policy preference, the
U.S. government remains involved in domestic
and international standard-setting. It is therefore
important to be able to discern good prospects
for such involvement-that is, situations in which
the investment of effort by government is likely to
do more good than harm-from bad prospects
for such involvement.
There are two questions embedded within this
question. First, is there anything wrong, generally,
with the current processes to the extent that it
Apr. 1, 2000) <www.zdnet.co.uk/news/1999/30/ns-9171.
html>.
22 SeeJOEL BRINKLEY, DEFINING VISION 30 (1997).
23 See, e.g., CLINTON & GORE, supra note 3, at 20 ("The
United States believes that the marketplace, not govern-
ments, should determine technical standards and other
mechanisms for interoperability.").
24 See Krishna Jayakar, Globalization and the Legitimacy of
International Telecommunications Standard-Setting Organizations,
5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUrD. 711, 729 (1998).
25 See id.
213 See id. at 718-21.
[Vol. 8
Government's Role in Telecomm Standardization
successfully produces standards without govern-
ment involvement? Second, are there cases where
government involvement can produce an affirma-
tive benefit?
III. THE CURRENT PROCESSES: TAKING
THE BAD ALONG WITH THE GOOD
Several observations, some of them critical, can
be made about the current processes: first, the de
facto process by which proprietary technology or
intellectual property becomes the prevailing stan-
dard has the benefit, from an entrepreneurial,
capitalist perspective, of letting the market deter-
mine what best serves users' needs. 27 This means,
in effect, that the winners in the system are com-
panies that are agile enough to identify opportu-
nities to capture an architecture and powerful
enough to sustain control over the architecture.
This is nirvana for companies meeting these crite-
ria, but not so great for companies outside the cri-
teria. In one sense, this might be chalked up to
the workings of the market, but the alleged "un-
fairness" of this system has been a source of com-
plaint and concern among the United States'
trading partners that have not yet developed a
strong culture of entrepreneurship.
Not every complaint deserves redress, of course,
and this is likely one of those that does not merit a
remedy. The problem is that countries that have
such complaints are likely to apply self-help. For
example, the government of China recently re-
portedly determined not to allow Windows 2000
to be installed on government computers so as to
encourage the development and deployment of a
competing operating system called Red Flag
Linux, a product of Chinese software develop-
ers.28 In the end, this problem is essentially a com-
mercial calculation for the owner of the proprie-
tary standard-are the near-term rents that flow
from the initial exploitation of the de facto stan-
dard greater than the revenues that the company
is forced to forgo when, and if, a backlash leads to
foreclosure of a market? If they are, then there is
no premium in opening the initial process to con-
27 See id. at 721.
28 See David Renniw, Chinese Fly Red Flag with Ban on
Microsoft, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 7, 2000, at 16. But see We'll
Keep the Red Flag Operating, COMPUTING, Jan. 13, 2000 (report-
ing that China denied banning Windows 2000 from govern-
ment computers).
29 See Cable Modem Standards & Specifications (visited Mar.
sultation or other steps that might avert such
backlash.
Second, the industry committee process by
which standards are developed can take a very
long time. The endeavor to establish a cable
modem standard had an original goal of Decem-
ber 1995 for publication. 29 Most committee
processes are designed to achieve consensus,
which can be elusive when the commercial stakes
are high and competitive interests are diverse.
Often, one or more factions will delay a final out-
come in hopes that technological or commercial
developments will overtake an undesirable result.
Whether government intervention in a long-lin-
gering standard-setting process can make things
go faster is imponderable. It merely sets up the
question, "faster than what?"
Third, there is a risk that the process will pro-
duce an answer that will end up isolating vendors
and fractionalizing the market rather than unit-
ing them behind a standard that is well accepted
by users. An example of this is the wireless net-
work standards situation that has ended up pro-
ducing one set of prevailing standards for the U.S.
market (Time Division Multiple Access and Code
Division Multiple Access) and another for most of
the rest of the world (Global System for Mobile
Communications) . 3 The result is that travelers
from Europe and Asia generally cannot use their
mobile handsets in the U.S., and U.S. travelers
might as well leave their telephones at home
when they travel abroad. Only now in the Third
Generation ("3G") of wireless telephony has there
developed the real prospect of a more rational re-
sult for the future. 31
IV. DISCERNING WHEN GOVERNMENT MAY
PLAY A BENEFICIAL ROLE: SHOULDA,
COULDA, WOULDA, DIDN'T AND DID
To benefit from past experience, we must first
discern when government intervention in a stan-
dard-setting process has been beneficial. Charting
past experience in terms of when the government
did or did not decide to intervene, against
25, 2000) <cabledatacomnews.com/cmic/cmic3.html>.
30 See Coran Carlson, Economist Oppose Single 3G Stan-
dards, WIRELESS WEEK (Mar. 30, 1998) <www.wirelessweek.
com/NEWS/3G/threegl0.htm>
31 See generally Industry Settlement Advances Standards Process
for Third Generation Wireless Services, FCC News Release, Mar.
26, 1999.
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whether that decision turned out to be wise or
beneficial by the best available objective mea-
sures, is one useful tool.
The grid below notes cases in which the govern-
ment did or did not become involved in the stan-
dard-setting process and the consequences,
judged retrospectively, of that action or the con-
trary action. Of course, in the real world, there
may be gradations of "yes" or "no," representing
various roles that government actors can choose
to play in the standard-setting process, even to the
point of simply issuing a threat of involvement
without actually getting involved. Such threats
also have an impact on the process, but they are
harder to document. Judging is based on whether
the decision was normatively correct or incorrect,
weighing the public good generated by the deci-
sion. Thus, in each case, it may be said that the
government "should" or "should not" have gotten
involved.
Table 1
Government Should Have Gotten Involved:
Affirmative Benefit Achieved or Forgone
Government Should Not Have Gotten Involved:
Negative Impact Realized or Avoided
Government Did Get Involved Affirmative Benefit Achieved: Negative Impact Realized:
* Public Safety Spectrum Interoperability * Cable Set-Top Boxes Digital Television
Standard Transmission Standard
" Digital Television ("DTV") Transmission
Standard
Government Did Not Get Involved Affirmative Benefit Forgone: Negative Impact Avoided:
* Wireless Telephony Standards e Cable Modem Standards
A. An Affirmative Benefit to a Government
Role
There are two types of cases in which a signifi-
cant, affirmative benefit to government involve-
ment can be foreseen. The first is one in which
the user market is relatively small in the sense that
user demand is not great, and there is a risk that
the normal industry and trade association
processes will "overlook" or not timely address the
market. The word "overlooked" is not used pejo-
ratively. A market is "overlooked" not only when it
is not developed because the prospects of profit
are not judged great enough to attract interest,
but is also "overlooked" when it is relatively less
profitable compared to other markets. Therefore,
in such circumstances, it may take so long for
commercial enterprises to explore prospects for a
market that the market and users' needs are effec-
tively not addressed.
The second type of case is one in which the
user market is very large, but there is a risk that a
protracted competition among proposed stan-
dards will significantly postpone important bene-
fits to consumers. The legitimacy of this case is en-
hanced when the benefits are judged to be
important not only on their own merits but also
when there are larger positive externalities that
may be captured by acceleration of the adoption
of the standard. The legitimacy of this case is fur-
ther enhanced when a shift to a new standard-
the adoption of which is judged to advance a pub-
lic good-is intended to replace or overtake a
standard that is embraced by a large embedded
base.
Three examples readily illustrate these two
cases:
" the need for standards to ensure interoper-
ability on spectrum used by public safety
agencies such as police, fire and emergency
medical services;
" the need for a declared, unified standard for
DTV transmission; and
" the discontinuities caused by the incompati-
ble standards that have emerged in the area
of wireless telephony (although as developed
below, the proper government role is not a
typical affirmative action to set the standard
but rather taking steps to preserve opportuni-
ties for competitive standards to develop).
1. The Case of Interoperable Public Safety Spectrum
In 1993, Congress responded to long-standing
complaints from the public safety community that
it was dangerously constrained by a spectrum
shortage, evidenced by acute spectrum conges-
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tion .3 2 In their response, Congress directed the
FCC to designate additional spectrum for the ex-
clusive use of public safety users. 33 Congress spe-
cifically directed the FCC to designate for such
use 24 MHz of the spectrum that will become
available in the ultrahigh frequency band (chan-
nels 60 to 69) when the transition to digital televi-
sion is complete. 34
In implementing this mandate, the FCC sought
to resolve another long-standing problem in the
public safety wireless communications area: the
lack of interoperability among jurisdictions and
emergency services. 3- Thus, in critical emergen-
cies such as the Oklahoma City bombing or the
Columbine High School shootings, emergency re-
sponders from different agencies and jurisdic-
tions have been unable to communicate directly
with one another from one handset deployed in
the field to another. In a makeshift workaround
solution to this problem, agencies sometimes
adopt a hub-and-spoke configuration in a com-
mon command center in which one representa-
tive of each responder stands in the hub and di-
rects instructions and information needed to
coordinate operations from operatives deployed
at the end of the spokes, back to the hub, and
then back to the spokes .3 This anomaly is an out-
growth of the way that spectrum historically has
been allocated to the agencies. Some spectrum is
especially well suited to some types of public
safety organizations. For example, relatively low
frequency spectrum has been favored by some
state police agencies, which have a need for very
wide geographic propagation of communications
312 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-66, § 6002, 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (as codified in 47
U.S.C. § 309)(j)(10)(B)(iv)). See also Talking with Champi-
ons-JamesJ Flyzik, Treasury, AccEss AMERICA (visited Nov. 8,
1999) <www.accessamerica.gov/docs/publicsafety-champi-
ons.html>.
33 See In re Development of Operational Technical and
Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Lo-
cal Public Safety Agency Communication Requirements
through the Year 2010; Establishment of Rules and Require-
ments for Priority Access Service, First Report and Order and
Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd. 152, 163-64,
para. 15 (1998) [hereinafter Requirements for Priority Acess Ser-
vice Order].
34 See id. at para. 2. See also FCC Adopts Rules for Licensing
Largest Block of Public Safety Radio Spectrum Ever Allocated (Rpt.
No. WT 98-24), FCC News Release, Aug. 6, 1998.
35 See Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Public Safety
National Coordination Committee Executive Summary (visited
Nov. 8, 1999) <www.fcc.gov/wtb/publicsafety/ncc/ncc-es.
html>.
signals.3 7 Once a public safety user becomes en-
sconced in a particular band and becomes com-
mitted to purchasing equipment designed to op-
erate in such frequencies, it tends to stay put. The
result has been a lack of interoperability in critical
situations.
The public safety community has been pursu-
ing this problem for several years within the struc-
ture of several organizations that have both public
safety officials and equipment industry officials as
members, such as TIA. 38 TIA is an ANSI-accred-
ited standard-setting organization. 39
Essentially two competing standards have
emerged that could be adopted to address the in-
teroperability problem: P25 ANSI from North
America and Trans European Terrestrial Trunked
Radio ("TETRA") European Technical Standards
Institute ("ETSI"), which was developed in Eu-
rope. P25 originated in "APCO Project 25" work-
ing groups and is referred to as APCO Project 25,
reflecting APCO's project numbering system, and
today is simply known as Project 25 or P25. P25 is
documented in ANSI as TIA-102, shorthand for
the entire suite of ANSI 102 standards. The tech-
nical review and approval process has been as-
sumed by TIA, ANSI's accredited standards devel-
opment organization. Phase I of the P25 ANSI
standard provides a common baseline for inter-
operability for both current and future P25 imple-
mentations. The TETRA standard was developed
and approved by ETSI. TETRA has gained cur-
rency in Europe, where it has been implemented
as the standard of choice among public safety
users.
36 See More Frequencies Below 800 MHz Needed for Public
Safety Use, COMM. TODAY, Aug. 13, 1998 (discussing the need
for additional towers when using frequencies above 800 MHz
for public safety communications).
37 See Robert Fenichel, APCO Project 25-Here, Now, and
Into the Future (visited Mar. 30, 2000) <www.apcointl.org/bul-
letin/bull/99/march/feature4.html>.
38 Another such organization is the Association of Public
Safety Communications Officials ("APCO") Project 25 coali-
tion formed by the joint efforts of the National Association of
State Telecommunication Directors ("NASTD"), the Associa-
tion of Public Safety Communications Officials International
and representatives of the U.S. government. APCO Project
25 includes participation from U.S. local, state and federal
public safety users, as well as users from Canada. See TIA
Press Release, TIA Publishes Systems Bulletins and Interior Stan-
dard on APCO Project 25 Uune 25, 1997) <www.tiaonline.org/
pubs/press-releases/1997/97-51 .cfm>.
39 See TIA Facts at a Glance (visited Sept. 2, 2000)
.<www.tiaonline.org/about/overview.cfm>.
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From a policy perspective, as opposed to an en-
gineering perspective that might focus more in-
tently on signal propagation characteristics and
tradeoffs in meeting user needs, there are pros
and cons to each of these proposals. First, there is
the timing issue. Project 25 is ready for implemen-
tation since it successfully has made its way
through the TIA vetting process and ANSI accred-
itation. 40 But Project 25 Phase I calls for channel
"widths" of 12.5 kHz, which the FCC, driven by
spectrum efficiency concerns, views as less than
ideal. 4' The FCC has been pressing for a solution
that involves channels of 6.25 kHz. 42 TETRA re-
quires 25 kHz channels and uses Time Division
Multiple Access ("TDMA") technology with four
voice slots. It has been approved by ETSI, but is
not ready for implementation in the U.S. because
it has not been through the TIA process, the U.S.
gatekeeper for implementation and adoption.43
Although there is cooperation between the two
standard-setting organizations, there is no "full
faith and credit" arrangement that obligates or al-
lows one organization to treat standards approved
by the other as approved in its jurisdiction. An-
other proposal, advanced by Ericsson, requires
12.5 kHz channels and uses TDMA technology
with two voice slots. It also has not been through
either ETSI or the TIA standards process. Like the
TETRA proposal, it has been introduced into the
TIA standards process. 44
There are also competitive aspects to the de-
bate accompanied by significant tension on the
part of vying interests. The TIA-102 standard was
embraced early on by Motorola, the manufacturer
40 See FCC Releases Service Rules for Public Safety 24 MHz Al-
location, Some Agencies Able to Begin Using Frequencies Prior to
2006, 53 LAND MOBILE RADIO NEWS, No. 40, Oct. 2, 1998
(describing the FCC's allocation of bands into 6.25 MHz).
41 See In re The Development, Technical and Spectrum
Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public
Safety Communication Requirements Through the Year
2010, Fourth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WT Dkt. No.
96-86, FCC 00-271, paras. 14-18 (rel. Aug. 2, 2000).
42 See id.
43 See TETRA Overview (visited Mar. 30, 2000)
<www.etsi.org/technicalactiv/tetra.htm>; APCO Interna-
tional Press Release, APCO International Project 25 Committee
Approves Ericsson, TETRA Proposals (Nov. 19, 1999) <www.ap
cointl.org/project25/p25.html>.
44 See Robert Fenichel, APCO Project 25-Here, Now, and
Into the Future (visited Mar. 30, 2000) <www.apcointl.org/
bulletin/bull/999/march/feature4.html>.
45 Motorola Press Release, Motorola Introduces First Project
25 Compliant Conventional System (Aug. 13, 1996) <www.motor
ola.com/General/Press/PR960826_4262.html>.
with the largest market share among public safety
system users. 45 Motorola has participated in both
standards venues and currently offers compliant
equipment to each standard in the respective
ANSI and ETSI areas of the world. Other con-
tenders in the field, Ericsson and Nokia, were ad-
herents of TDMA technology; Nokia supporting
TETRA, and Ericsson 46 supporting its own TDMA
solution. Over time, the process affected a rap-
prochement between the two standards in the
sense of making progress on compatibility issues.
Nokia, Ericsson and Motorola have all set forth
proposals or guidelines in the P25 process for the
North American Phase II TDMA solutions.
47
The decision concerning what standard shall be
adopted for operations in the spectrum desig-
nated for interoperability rests with the FCC.4 1
This is because the FCC is responsible for "type
acceptance" of radios that will operate at the des-
ignated frequency. Since no radios previously
have operated at this frequency-it is currently
being used for television broadcast-this is a new
exercise. 49 The responsibility for type acceptance
derives from Congress' mandate to the FCC that it
adopt regulations governing potential radio fre-
quency interference. 51° In some cases, the FCC has
also included interoperability standards as part of
its type-acceptance requirements. Even so, the
FCC could essentially delegate the duty of choos-
ing the standard to others, and this it did in a Sep-
tember 1998 order.5'
In the Requirements for Priority Access Service Order,
the FCC declined to adopt a standard. 52 Instead,
it directed the formation of a federal advisory
46 Ericsson's private radio systems operations were re-
cently acquired by Com-Net Critical Communications. See
Ericsson Press Release, Ericsson's Private Radio Systems business
acquired by Corn-Net Critical Communications (Jan. 7, 2000)
<www.ericsson.dk/pressroom/PressReleases/PRindex S_
Corporate.html>.
47 See Ericsson Press Release, Ericsson Offers Proposal to
Harmonize Third-Generation Mobile Communications (Dec. 8,
1998) <www.gsmdata.com/arteric.htm>; APCO International
Press Release, Project 25 Committee Approves Ericsson, TETRA
Proposals (Nov. 19, 1999) <www.apcointl.org/project25/p25
steering.rtf>; Motorola Press Release, Motorola Proposes Unify-
ing Guidelines for North American Two-Way Radio Communica-
tions Standard (Oct. 25, 1999).
48 See 47 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
49 See Requirements for Priority Access Service Order, 14 FCC
Rcd. at 154, para. 1.
50 See 47 U.S.C. § 302(a); 47 C.F.R § 2.901 (2000).
51 See Requirements for Priority Access Service Order, 14 FCC
Rcd. at 154, para. 1.
52 See id. at 156-57, para. 7.
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committee named the Public Safety National Co-
ordination Committee ("NCC"). 53 The charge of
the NCC was to fashion recommendations to the
FCC concerning a standard for the interoper-
ability spectrum, among other assignments. 54
Originally, the FCC contemplated that the NCC
would undertake an independent standard-setting
exercise, 55 but upon reconsideration, the FCC au-
thorized the NCC to rely upon previous work of
ANSI-accredited standard-setting organizations,
such as TIA.5 6 Without authority to do so, the
NCC likely would have had to become ANSI-ac-
credited itself, which would have required more
time in a process that already had become argua-
bly overdue in light of the statute's 1998 deadline
for licensing the spectrum to public safety enti-
ties.5 7
The NCC is in the process of preparing recom-
mendations for the FCC, an exercise that began
in February 1999.58 Initial recommendations were
forwarded to the FCC in February 2000, with the
life of the NCC anticipated to last up to four years
beyond the date of its 1999 inception. 59 The re-
port recommended that the FCC embrace TIA-
102 ANSI as the standard for the new spectrum, a
decision that will put in motion production plans
for handsets and infrastructure that operate at the
designated frequency based on the TIA-102 suite
of standards. 60
There are numerous characteristics of the pub-
lic safety market and the standard-setting process
that made the government's involvement in the
standard-setting process for the interoperability
spectrum more sensible than the alternatives.
First, the market for public safety equipment-in-
frastructure, base stations and mobile units-is
much smaller than the market for commercial
mobile infrastructure and devices. It is also frac-
tionalized. Purchasing decisions are made at the
state, county or local level, and are often made by
different agencies and processes at the various ju-
risdictional levels. There are numerous formal
53 See id.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See Development of Operational, Technical and Spec-
trum Requirements For Meeting Federal, State and Local
Public Safety Agency Communication Requirements
Through the Year 2010, Memorandum Opinion and Order on
Reconsideration, 14 FCC Rcd. 8059, 8065, para. 11 (1999).
57 See id. at 8064-65, para. 10.
58 See id.
59 See id.
and informal professional networks to share and
coordinate information about dealing with ven-
dors. But purchasing decisions and purchasing
power are rarely coordinated. Perhaps the next
best thing is a role for the government in aggre-
gating the selection power for standards, while
maintaining sensitivity to the unique and varied
needs of public safety users. These effects, how-
ever, must be balanced with the competitive vital-
ity of the public safety market.
Second, the government role was not a matter
of starting from scratch. Particularly after the
FCC's reconsideration order, the government's
role, played out in part through the NCC, built
significantly upon what had gone before in pro-
fessional and commercial standard-setting groups.
Third, the public good stakes are high. The
perpetuation of communications problems
caused by the lack of interoperability is not quan-
tifiable in impact; it is difficult to say what toll
such problems have already had in draining or di-
verting emergency response resources. But al-
lowing such problems to continue is an uncom-
fortable path; their perpetuation seems virtually
certain to lead eventually to direct adverse conse-
quences that will be laid at the doorstep of the
interoperability problem.
2. The Case of Digital Television
One of the most contentious public policy is-
sues in telecommunications during the 1990s was
the transition to digital television ("DTV"). The is-
sues subject to debate were legion. One issue was
the basis on which the spectrum should be made
available to broadcasters-whether it should be
auctioned, as most other spectrum for commer-
cial use was being handled at the time pursuant to
congressional mandate. 61 In the end, Congress
decided to allocate temporarily 6MHz of spec-
trum to each broadcast licensee without auc-
tions.62 Another issue was whether the broadcast-
60 See Public Safety National Coordination Committee Recom-
mendations to the Federal Communications Commission for Techni-
cal and Operational Standards for Uses of the 764-776 MHz and
794-806 MHz Public Safety Band Pending Development of Final
Rules (Feb. 25, 2000) <www.fcc.gov/wtb/publicsafety/ncc/
feb25body.pdf>.
61 See Mass Media Bureau, Policy and Rules Division, Fed-
eral Communications Commission, Digital Television Tower Sit-
ing Fact Sheet and Frequently Asked Questions (visited Feb. 12,
2000) <www.fcc.gov/mmb/prd/dtv>.
62 See id.
20001
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
ers should be required to use the spectrum to
provide high definition television ("HDTV")-es-
sentially sharper, richer television images-or
whether broadcasters should be permitted flexi-
bility to use the spectrum for a variety of advanced
services. 63 Eventually, it was decided to afford
broadcasters flexibility. 64 Another issue was the
timing of the surrender of the spectrum now used
for traditional analog broadcasting so that that
spectrum could be auctioned. 65 Congress decided
to schedule completion of the transition to digital
for 2006, with escape clauses in the event that
there is evidence that viewers have not made a
transition by buying DTV receiver equipment
(new televisions or new set-top boxes) .66
All of these policy and allocative fairness issues
built upon the successful execution of a process to
reach agreement on the even more fundamental
issue of what transmission standard to use for
DTV. A single standard was desirable because of
the characteristics of the mass consumer market
for electronics-asking consumers to consider up-
grading a television that is working fine (or to buy
a set-top box for a television that works fine with-
out one) is one thing. But asking them to make a
choice among competing standards advanced by
competing brands was deemed a step more than
regulators and the industry should expect con-
sumers to take. The FCC's order adopting the
DTV standard reflects robust debate among com-
menters about whether FCC action was necessary
and whether the market could operate without
such intervention to establish a standard.6 7 The
FCC's order recites concerns about the delays that
startup, coordination and splintering could cause
for DTV adoption. 6 1 But it concluded "we are not
convinced that these problems are so severe that
they would absolutely preclude us from allowing
the market to operate without a set standard."69
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 allows broadcasters
to continue to use the spectrum for which they are now li-
censed beyond.2006 if, for example, less than 85% of televi-
sion households in a market have the equipment to receive
DTV signals. See Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, 258 (1997)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (2000)).
67 See In re Advanced Television Systems and Their Im-
pact Upon the Existing Television Broad. Service, Fourth Re-
port and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 17,771, 17,777-79, paras. 10-14.
(1996) [hereinafter DTV Fourth Report and Order].
68 See id. at 17,776, para. 8 (explaining that "[s] tartup re-
fers to the situation where everyone would be better off
Nevertheless, the FCC continued, "we are con-
cerned that market solutions may result in more
than one sustainable transmission standard. '" 70
The consequences, the FCC concluded, would be
unacceptable:
Such an outcome might result in compatibility
problems and increase the risk that consumer DTV
equipment purchased in one city would not work well
in another city; that a receiver would not display all the
broadcast channels in a city; or that a digital television
set purchased one year might not work several years
later. Such results would hurt consumers and make it
more difficult to preserve a universally available broad-
cast television service.
7
'
By the time the rules were finally adopted at
year-end 1996, the process had been underway for
many years, going back to 1987 in terms of the
FCC's involvement. In 1987, the FCC chartered a
federal advisory committee, the Advisory Commit-
tee on Advanced Television Service ("ACATS"), to
make recommendations concerning the transi-
tion to what was then called Advanced Television
("ATV"). 72 Initially, additional spectrum alloca-
tions were not contemplated in deploying ATV. 73
Rather, the FCC envisioned upgrades on existing
broadcast frequencies.7 4 But the FCC decided a
few years later that temporarily allocating an addi-
tional 6MHz of spectrum for deployment of ATV
would better advance a less disruptive transition. 75-
By February 1993, ACATS reported to the FCC
that it could not recommend any of the four com-
peting digital television systems then under dis-
cussion over the others because all required more
work and development.71' Later that year, the
seven entities that had been working on the four
contending systems (AT&T and Zenith Electron-
ics Corporation; General Instruments Corpora-
tion and the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy; and a consortium composed of Thomson
Consumer Electronics, Philips Consumer Elec-
adopting DTV technology, but no one has the incentive to
move first. Coordination is the collaborative effort by, broad-
casters, consumer equipment manufacturers, and program
producers that is necessary to introduce DTV. Splintering re-
fers to the breakdown of consensus or agreement to use the
DTV Standard.") (footnotes omitted).
69 Id. at 17,778, para. 34.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See id. at 17,773, para. 4.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See id.
76 See id.
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tronics and the David Samoff Research Center)
formed "The Grand Alliance" to develop a final,
unified standard.7 7 It voted its final recommenda-
tion in November 1995.78
The path of implementing the standard has
been wrought with controversy since its adoption.
Issues concerning- surrender of the existing
broadcast spectrum continue to roil. The rollout
schedule for tower extensions necessary to deploy
DTV has been fraught with delay. And the merits
of the standard selected have been subject to chal-
lenge. In October 1999, Sinclair Broadcast Group,
Inc. filed a Petition for Expedited Rulemaking
seeking a reopening of the DTV standard. 79 It
urged the FCC to modify its rules to allow broad-
casters to employ the Coded Orthogonal Fre-
quency Division Multiplexing ("COFDM") stan-
dard that ACATS had rejected in addition to the
one it had recommended. 0 Sinclair urged that
the standard adopted by the FCC did not reliably
allow indoor reception of DTV signals, where
most people like to watch television."'
In February 2000, the FCC rejected the peti-
tion, citing the work of the FCC's Office of Engi-
neering and Technology, which had studied both
standards and "concluded that the benefits of
changing the DTV transmission standard' to
COFDM would not outweigh the costs of making
such a revision."8' 2 The FCC also concluded that
"the Sinclair petition had done no more than to
demonstrate a shortcoming of early DTV receiver
implementation," which manufacturers were
working hard to overcome.83
Even taking account of these bumps in the
road, and even though pervasive implementation
in a way that benefits "real people" is still a long
way off, it is not too early to observe that govern-
ment involvement probably did more good than
harm in the DTV standard-setting process. The
FCC's order, however, demurs taking credit for
this positive impact, stating "[t]his proceeding
demonstrates how competing industries, working
together, can develop de facto industry-selected
standards that satisfy the interests of contending
parties."8 4
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact
Upon the Existing Television Broad. Service, Petition for Expe-
dited Rulemaking, filed on behalf of Sinclair Broad. (Oct. 8,
1999).
80 See id. at i.
But the DTV standard is not a classic example
of a de facto standard. It was developed by a con-
sortium of companies under the auspices of a fed-
eral advisory committee. The output of the advi-
sory committee was circulated for public notice
and comment and eventually codified in federal
regulations. These characteristics present abun-
dant contrasts with the process by which, for ex-
ample, Microsoft Windows became the de facto
dominant standard operating system for desktop
processors. Government involvement was an indis-
pensable element.
The characteristics that made the DTV transi-
tion suitable for a government role in selecting
the transmission standard are evident. First, the
need for the public and the broadcasters to move
together in a sequenced transition made the pro-
cess a good candidate for government involve-
ment. The transmission standard affected infra-
structure and. equipment purchase decisions on
the broadcasters' side of the equation and con-
sumer purchase decisions on the viewers' side of
the equation. One group cannot make decisions
until the other does, and the industries on the
broadcast side of the equation are easier to organ-
ize for input on technical subjects than are view-
ers.
Second, the decision on standards involved
coaxing consumers beyond an investment in a col-
lective embedded base that is quite large. Taking
into account the durability of receivers and the
number of households that own more than one
television receiver, it is asking a lot of consumers
to make the switch.
Third, the timing urgency created by another
public policy force.made the DTV process a good
candidate for government participation. That
public policy force was the advent of auctions, and
the tether between the auction process and the
budget process. The proceeds of auctions had to
be factored into federal budget projections; thus,
certainty about the timing of auctions was desira-
ble. Without agreement about a transmission stan-
dard, regulators could make no reliable projec-
tion of when the transition to DTV would be
81 See id. at ii.
82 FCC Denies Sinclair Petition for Rulemaking on COFDM
Standard, FCC News Release, (Feb. 4, 2000).
83 Id.
84 DTVFourth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 17,772,
para. 2.
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complete and when, therefore, the spectrum cur-
rently occupied by broadcasters would be availa-
ble for auction.
3. The Case of Wireless Telephony Standards
Occasionally, the need for a government role in
standard-setting is measured by the gap left when
government declines to play a role. The current
generation of digital mobile wireless service in the
U.S. ("2G") operates under three standards:
" TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access),
which divides a channel into timeslots and
sorts user transmissions into these timeslots;
" CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access), a
spread spectrum technology; and
" GSM (Global System for Mobile Communica-
tions), a European standard for digital cellu-
lar system that has gained some currency in
the U.S.8 5
In January 1998, the European Telecommuni-
cations Standards Institute ("ETSI") agreed upon
a Third Generation ("3G") mobile wireless stan-
dard that relies on a combination of TDMA- and
CDMA-based standards.8a The standard is called
UTRA, an acronym for UMTS (Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System) Terrestrial Radio
Access.8 7 Wideband-CDMA ("W-CDMA") will be
used for wide-area applications and Time Divi-
sion-CDMA ("TD-CDMA") will be used for indoor
applications involving low mobility.88 This stan-
dard was forwarded to the ITU for considera-
tion.8 9
The United States, by contrast, took the stance
that the market can support multiple standards
and that over time the market will pick a predomi-
nant standard. Accordingly, the United States for-
warded to the ITU four proposals for co-existing
3G standards. 9°1
There is a substantial and important role that
the ITU appropriately can play in evaluating these
standards. The choice was essentially between a
unified standard chosen by ETSI and a menu of
standards advocated by the United States. The
85 See GSM World, North American 1999 GSM Highlights
(visited June 26, 2000) <www.gsmworld.com/news/latest_
news7.html>.
86 See UMTS Report No. 5, Minimum Spectrum Demand per
Public Terrestrial UMTS Operator in Initial Phase <www.umts-fo-
rum.org/reports.html>.
87 See id.
88 See id.
failure of the system, up until this point, to organ-
ize submission and negotiation over national or
regional standards is inefficient. The ITU's in-
volvement in evaluating and recommending 3G
wireless standards can help mitigate or avoid this
type of diseconomy and inefficiency. The results
of the recent World Radio Conference, under the
auspices of the ITU, represents good progress to-
ward a recommendation along the lines of flexi-
bility and a technology-neutral multiband ap-
proach. - I
This case makes the point that government en-
tities can have different roles at different jurisdic-
tional levels. The U.S. government's involvement
in the process was essentially to take no positive
role in forcing a unification of the competing
standards proffered domestically in the U.S. and
to urge the relevant international governmental
organization, the ITU, to permit multiple stan-
dards to develop rather than allow essentially
mandatory regional standards to prevail. Thus, on
the one hand, a national government elected not
to become involved domestically, while urging a
governmental entity at a supernational jurisdic-
tional level to become involved-but only for the
purpose of preserving competing standards.
The characteristics of this situation make it ripe
for government involvement of a limited and atyp-
ical nature at the international level. First, the na-
ture of government involvement here is not in
line with the other examples. The aim of the U.S.
government's involvement appears to be an at-
tempt to keep the decisional environment open
to competing standards. The correctness of this
judgment is supported by the relatively benign ex-
perience of mobile telephone users in the United
States. Although the absence of a single standard
has put some limits on the availability of roaming,
the fact that several carriers have built and devel-
oped networks with nationwide footprints has mit-
igated this problem. Also, the development of
roaming agreements to cover areas with compati-
ble networks outside the home carrier's network
has helped. Thus, the absence of a unified U.S.
89 See generally UMTS Reports (visited July 2, 2000) <www.
umts-forum.org/reports.html>.
90 See UMTS Backs 30 Harmony, ELECTRONIC TIMES, June
14, 1999.
9 See WRC-2000 Wraps Up Work with Spectrum Deals, De-
spite Last-Minute Wrangling over BSS Replanning, TELECOMM.
REI'S. (June 5, 2000) <www.tr.com/tronlone/tr/2000/
tr060500/tr060500-04.htm>.
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standard for first and second generation wireless
services has been generally no worse than an in-
convenience that has not noticeably retarded de-
velopment of service or subscriber growth.
Second, the market to be served is enormous,
in contrast with, for example, the public safety
wireless community. This affords room for experi-
mentation. The downside of "failed" experiments
has relatively less dire consequences for the
mostly social and commercial users of nonpublic
safety wireless services. Should a competing stan-
dard not survive in the marketplace, the costs of
migrating users to a system that employs a surviv-
ing standard are diffuse and not borne directly on
the public budget, in contrast to the example of
public safety users.
Third, the benefits of variety and innovation
that generally accompany competition can be
achieved in a way that is compatible with improv-
ing the availability of roaming. With competing
standards being deployed in the world market-
place, the incentive to coordinate can work
among network builders to promote roaming. If a
single standard prevails in one part of the world,
by contrast, coordination becomes a take it or
leave it proposition-other providers must build
to that standard or abandon the prospect of
roaming. The ubiquitous deployment of networks
using competing standards, at least until the mar-
ket identifies which, if any, is superior for various
purposes, thus produces enhanced incentives for
coordination.
B. Cases Where Government Involvement is of
Minimal or Questionable Benefit
Likewise, there are cases in which government
involvement in telecommunications standard-set-
ting provide little benefit. Set-top boxes and cable
modem standards are two examples.
1. The Case of Cable Set-Top Boxes
The transition to DTV has created several issues
with respect to the relationship of the cable indus-
try to the broadcast industry. Many of these issues
92 See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (1) (1994).
93 See id. at § 325(b) (1).
94 See Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competi-
tion Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992)
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611
(1994)).
go back to a fundamental policy decision that
Congress made in 1984 giving local broadcasters
two powerful options in dealing with the local
cable operator's carriage of the broadcast signal. 92
First, broadcasters had the option of invoking a
statutory requirement that the cable operator
"must carry" the broadcast signal on the valuable
basic tier of service that all cable subscribers re-
ceive. 93 The statutory provision rested on the leg-
islative policy judgment that cable would be so
preferred by viewers to over-the-air broadcast that
the vitality of local broadcast might be threatened
if local broadcast channels were not widely availa-
ble via the cable platform. 94
Congress also gave broadcasters a valuable sec-
ond option. Broadcasters, as an alternative to in-
voking the must carry obligation of cable opera-
tors, may require the operator to enter into
negotiations for "retransmission consent." 9 5
These negotiations are intended to lead to com-
pensation for the broadcaster in consideration for
the broadcaster's consent for the cable operator's
retransmission of the broadcast signal.
The must carry regime has been upheld by the
Supreme Court against cable industry challenges
that it imposed an undue burden on cable opera-
tors and violated their First Amendment rights. 9 6
The Court's rationale rested largely on its accept-
ance that it was legitimate for Congress to adopt
and enforce the must carry regime because of the
possible threat that would be posed to the vitality
and viability of local broadcast. 97 While acquiesc-
ing in the Supreme Court's decision upholding
analog must carry, cable operators have opposed
the way in which some broadcasters have con-
strued the law-that operators would have the ob-
ligation to carry both the analog and the digital
signal for the duration of the transition and that
cable operators would have an obligation to trans-
mit multiple signals if broadcasters chose to use
their spectrum in such a way."
The question would not be so weighty but for
the messy edges of the transition. The transition
to DTV will not be complete until the broadcast-
ers have ceased broadcasting on the frequencies
now used for broadcasting analog signals.99 They
95 See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (1).
96 See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
97 See id. at 187-92.
98 See generally Harris J. Aaron, Note, I Want My MTV: The
Debate Over Digital Must-Carry, 80 B.U. L. REV. 885 (2000).
99 See generally Larry Bloomfield, Cable-Broad. Compatibil-
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may have a respite from relinquishing that spec-
trum in some markets until a significant percent-
age of households have purchased television re-
ceivers capable of receiving digital broadcast
signals. Until the cost of the receivers comes down
significantly, such penetration is unlikely to occur.
In various contexts, the FCC has stated its expec-
tation that the spectrum will be relinquished by
2006, but the statutory trigger is more complex
and dependent to some measure upon penetra-
tion of receivers.' 00
In the meantime, cable customers that take the
plunge and purchase digital receivers will find
that they cannot receive digital signals via the
cable platform unless they have purchased a set-
top box that is capable of receiving the signal or
have purchased a digital cable ready receiver."" I
Neither of these is generally available on the com-
mercial market yet. ' 0 2
The FCC is already deeply involved in commer-
cial decisions about cable set-top boxes because of
Section 629 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.103 Section 629 directs the FCC to promul-
gate rules that would foster the development of a
competitive commercial market in set-top naviga-
tion devices so that cable subscribers could obtain
such appliances from multiple sources.'1 4 At the
same time, Congress directed the FCC to protect
multichannel video providers' content security.'15
In other words, to the extent that the set-top box
plays a role in preventing unauthorized reception
of signals, the FCC was directed by statute to make
sure that this function was not sacrificed. 1116 The
FCC's order permitted the integration of the se-
ity-an Oxymoron?, BROAD. ENGINEERING, Apr. 30, 2000 [here-
inafter Bloomfield].
100 See generally id.; see also Mark Wigfield, Cable, Electronics
Industries Okay Digital-TV Pact, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Feb.
23, 2000, at 19:30:00 ("All viewers are to have access to digital
television by 2002, and broadcast stations must return their
analog spectrum license to the FCC by 2006.").
101 See generally Glen Dickson, Back to the Future, BROAD. &
CABLE, Aug. 2, 1999.
102 See generally Bloomfield, supra note 99.
103 See, e.g., id.
104 See 47 U.S.C. § 549(a) (1994) ("The Commission
shall, in consultation with appropriate industry standard-set-
ting organizations, adopt regulations to assure the commer-
cial availability, to consumers of multichannel video pro-
gramming systems, of converter boxes, interactive
communications equipment, and other equipment used by
consumers to access multichannel video programming and
other services.").
105 See 47 U.S.C. § 549(b) ("The Commission shall not-
prescribe regulations under subsection (a) which wouldjeop-
curity and navigation functions for a limited time
until 2005, after which time it would be unlawful
to integrate both functions in the box.10 7 The pro-
hibition is designed to foster competition among
manufacturers in the navigational device market.
Two fundamental issues that remain unresolved
involve the requirements for DTV receivers to be-
come cable compatible and licensing arrange-
ments for protection against unauthorized copy-
ing of cable content. The National Association of
Broadcasters has urged the FCC to step into the
breach, beyond the 'jawboning" in which it al-
ready has engaged. The Commission has com-
menced a broad proceeding threatening to imple-
ment rules if agreement cannot be reached l08
Raising the stakes in this way can be equivalent
to actual involvement if the threat of imminence
and inevitability is credible. But it is unnecessary
to achieve the desired result and at odds with
other undertakings of the FCC that affect the
transition to DTV.
First, the debate about receiver and set-top box
compatibility is closely tied to the debate over dig-
ital must carry. At the end of the transition, it is
likely that cable operators will end up carrying the
broadcasters' primary signals either because they
are forced to do so by the FCC or because they
deem it to be in their own commercial interest. In
either event, this eventuality will require the cable
industry to be ready at the end of the transition
with operating boxes in the home. The set-top
box problem is likely to heal itself as a side benefit
of the conclusion of the DTV transition. Addi-
tional intervention is not useful or needed.
ardize security of multichannel video programming and
other services offered over multichannel video systems, or
impede the legal rights of a provider of such services to pre-
vent theft of service.").
106 See In re Amendment of Parts 2, 15, 18 and Other
Parts of the Commission's Rules to Simplify and Streamline
the Equipment Authorization Process for Radio Frequency
Equipment, Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 11,415, 11,4416,
para. 2 (1998) [hereinafter Streamlining Order]; but see Commis-
sion Advances "Navigation Devices" Rules Creating Consumer Mar-
ket for Set Top Boxes: Allows Analog Deferral, FCC News Release,
May 13, 1999 (visitedJune 26, 2000) <www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
Cable/News_Releases/ 1999/nrcb9009.html> (noting that
the Commission is considering whether to accelerate the
compliance date to 2003).
107 See In re Implementation of Section 304 of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd.
14,775, 14,776, para. 3 (1998).
108 See In re Compatibility Between Cable Systems and
Consumer Electronics Equipment, Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, PP Dkt No. 00-67 (rel. Apr. 14, 2000).
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Second, one of the greatest risks of sidetracking
this benefit rests within the control of the FCC it-
self. The broadcasters' proposals to enlarge the
must carry requirement so that cable operators
would be required to carry multiple signals during
the transition or thereafter is a deterrent to reach-
ing the point where carriage of the primary signal
is acceptable. So far, the agency has not rushed to
embrace multiple signal plans, and its continued
resistance supports the right outcome in the set-
top box proceeding as well.
2. The Case of Cable Modem Standards
In 1999, a pitched battle came to a head be-
tween cable operators and certain Internet Ser-
vice Providers over the issue of whether the net-
work that enables provisioning of high-speed
cable modem data service should be open to
others, notjust cable operators on a wholesale ba-
sis to provide customer service. 10 9 The leading
proponent of this viewpoint was AOL, arguing
that the proprietary cable platform would become
a bottleneck. 110 It was critical, they argued, that
regulators establish rules to prevent cable opera-
tors from affording exclusive access to the plat-
form to favored affiliates, such as Excite@Home
and Roadrunner."' Allies of this position in-
cluded the Regional Bell Operating Companies
("RBOCs"), which argued that the anti-bottleneck
rules that applied to the local loop in telephony
justly should be applied to the cable plant to
achieve parity in the regulatory scheme-or else
the regulatory burden should be lifted from the
RBOCs' provisioning of high-speed data services
in order to achieve parity.' 12
Proponents of the cable position argued that
cable modem service was nascent and had no
market share that posed a plausible near-term
. 109 See generally, Earl W. Comstock &John W. Butler, Ac-
cess Denied: The FCC's Failure to Implement Open Access to Cable as
Required by the Communications Act, 8 COMMLAw CONSPEcrus 5
(2000).
110 See id.
III See id.
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 See, e.g., America Online, Memorandum of Understand-
ing Between Time Warner, Inc. and America Online (visited May
24, 2000) <media.web.aol.com/media/pressview.cfm?>
("AOL Time Warner will effectuate such choice for consum-
ers by negotiating arm's-length commercial agreements with
both affiliated (such as AOL) and unaffiliated ISPs that wish
threat of becoming a bottleneck.' 13 Opponents
responded that it was important to fix the rules
before a bottleneck was ensconced, which likely
would happen given the attractiveness of cable
modem service and the strong marketing position
cable operators occupied with respect to their ex-
isting base of video subscribers."14
Proponents of the cable position argued that
rules regarding cable networks being opened to
competitors were best left to commercial negotia-
tion. 115 In other words, cable operators advocated
that, rather than having the government declare
that the networks must be open and set, the po-
tential contracting parties should be permitted to
find commercially sensible terms for contracts be-
tween operators and competitive providers with-
out the overhang of government intervention. 6
At one level, the debate became focused on
what the obstacles to opening the cable network
were. Some argued that the main reason not to
open the networks was one of fairness: that- the
networks were built with private investment and
were, as such, private property.' '7 The argument
ran that the government must have a very substan-
tial justification for demanding that a private
property owner share its property, even with com-
pensation, with rivals. 1 " Here, there was no such
justification some operators and their advocates
argued, because there was no evidence of a bottle-
neck, in contrast with the substantial historical ex-
perience of the local loop for telephony.
Others argued that technical obstacles made
opening the cable network at least difficult, if not
impractical. The argument was that there were
few practical points where interconnection of the
incumbent and competing networks could be
achieved without sacrificing quality of service or
customer care, a problem that scaled in propor-
tion to the number of competitive providers the
to offer service on the AOL Time Warner broadband cable
systems. Pursuant to such commercial agreements, AOL
Time Warner will partner with ISPs to offer consumers a
choice of competing broadband internet service offerings.").
116 See In re Applications for Consent to Transfer of Con-
trol of Licenses from MediaOne Group, Inc. to AT&T Corp,
Application for Transfer of Control and Public Interest Showing, CS
Dkt. No. 99-251 July 12, 1999).
117 See generally In re Applications for Consent to Transfer
of Control of Licenses from MediaOne Group, Inc. to AT&T
Corp, Reply Comments of AT&T Corp. and MediaOne, Inc., CS
Dkt. No. 99-251, at 6 (Sept. 17, 1999) (noting, among other
things, that AT&T has invested over $100 billion in its mar-
ket-enktry strategy).
118 See id.
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incumbent had to accommodate."II 9
In the course of the debate came the assertion
that the root of the problem that made opening
the cable network difficult lay in the architectures
and embedded standards cable operators had
chosen to deploy their networks. This portion of
the debate came to a head when GTE, Com-
puserveClassic and AOL announced the results of
a trial they had conducted in Florida to refute
cable operators' arguments about the difficulty of
allowing multiple ISPs to have direct access to cus-
tomers via the cable platform. 120 GTE's news re-
lease said that it had worked with several different
vendors using off the shelf equipment, and it had
made changes to its own cable modem platform
to allow competing ISPs to gain access to custom-
ers.121 It summed the one-time required invest-
ment as "less than a dollar a home passed."'1 22 The
trial was criticized by Excite@Home, a principal
provider of cable modem-linked services and por-
tals as an incomplete experiment:
Even if traffic can be directed to the proper ISP, the
cable infrastructure is a shared network ... Because of
the nature of the shared network, allocation of capacity
is problematic . . . It would effectively turn cable's fat
pipe into multiple thinner pipes like DSL[,] . . .
[which] is grossly stb-optimal in the cable environ-
ment. 123
The vocabulary of the open access debate has
had many variations over its life, many different
ways in which the petition for regulatory interven-
tion has been voiced. At its common denomina-
tor, however, is the notion that the regulators
ought to step in to standardize the way in which
competing ISPs could access the architecture of
the cable modem platform. The arguments have
been aimed at federal regulators, policy-makers
and legislators, and at local officials who superin-
tend renewal of the franchise agreements that
119 See GTE News Release, GT7 Demonstrates Ease of Cable
Open Access to Multiple ISPs; Clearwater Trial Shows One-Time In-
vestment of Less Than $1 Per Home Would Provide Consumer
Choice (June 14, 1999) <www.gte.com/AboutGTE/News
Center/News/Releases/ClearwaterOpenAccess.html>.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 Id.
123 Exite@Home Press Release, The Technical Shortcomings
of the GTE "Open Access" Trial (visited Mar. 30, 2000) <www.
home.net/source/techdetails.html>.
124 See OpenNet Coalition Press Release, Maryland, Kan-
sas Join Open Access Bandwagon (Feb. 7, 2000) <www.opennet
coalition.org/news/949962651.shtml> (noting that open ac-
cess legislation had been introduced in Md., Va., Kan., Pa.,
Mich., Ill., Vt., Del. and Idaho).
permit operators to serve subscribers in a given lo-
cale.
To date, some local officials have found these
arguments appealing,124 but the FCC has declined
to intervene on the ground that the cable modem
service industry is nascent and should develop
free of added regulatory requirements. 25 It
would take intervention at the federal level to im-
pose a comprehensive change in the architectures
commonly deployed in the cable plant, and the
reluctance to step in is a sensible result for several
reasons.
First, the evolution of the debate has turned out
to validate the proposition that open access could
be a sensible commercial proposition. After its ac-
quisition of Time Warner, for example, AOL
stepped back from its vigorous public advocacy of
open access, having achieved the core of its objec-
tives by commercial means.' 26 Other cable opera-
tors also have announced commercial decisions to
open their networks.' 27
Second, the thrust of the case for government
intervention was essentially an invitation to the
government to level the playing field between en-
tities with different means for bridging the last
mile (cable modem vs. DSL; AT&T vs. GTE), or
between entities with a means for bridging the last
mile and those without the means for doing so
(cable modem vs. no owned infrastructure; AT&T
vs. AOL). A comparison is made to past congres-
sional actions: In the Telecommunications Act of
1996 Congress determined that it was appropriate
to require the RBOCs to open their networks to
competitors. 28 But that judgment rested on over
a decade's observation that the local exchange
had become a bottleneck facility and without an
125 See FCC Chairman William E. Kennard, Remarks
Before the National Cable Television Association (June 15,
1999) <www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/spwek921.html>.
126 See Peter S. Goodman & Craig Timberg, AOL Ends Its
Push for Open Access, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2000, at Al, 11; see
also Kathy Chen, AOL Changes Tune in Debate On Cable Access,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2000, at B1.
127 See Letter from David N. Baker, et al. to FCC Chair-
man Kennard (Dec. 6, 1999) <www.att.com/press/item/
0,1354,2331,00>; see also AT&T Press Release, AT&T Commits
to Give Consumers Choice of ISPs for High-Speed Internet Access Via
Cable, Fixed Wireless (visited May 15, 2000) <www.att.com/
press/item/0, 1354,2320,00>; AT&T Press Release, AT&T
Commits to Open Cable Access (visited May 15, 2000) <www.clec-
planet.com/news/9912/991206att.htm>.
128 See, e.g.,18U.S.C.§ 251 (2000);18U.S.C.§ 271 (2000).
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open access obligation, competition was not possi-
ble.
V. CONCLUSION
Many aspects of the telecommunications indus-
try, even as various segments become more com-
petitive and less regulated, still have significant re-
lationships with industry regulators and policy-
makers at the federal level. This may be because
the companies are themselves still significantly
regulated, are spin-offs of regulated enterprises,
or because they rely on regulators and policy-mak-
ers to police the behavior of their competitors.
In general, the case studies demonstrate that
the most hopeful case for a productive govern-
ment role is where the market is least likely to
provide a timely and useful answer, as in the case
of public safety spectrum standards. The least
likely cases for a productive government role are
those in which the government is being called in
by parties in interest to substitute for commercial
negotiation, as in the case of cable modem stan-
dards and "open access." In between these two
poles are cases that have mixed characteristics
that will make government involvement a close
question. Overall, government should be reluc-
Because the industry and federal regulators and
policy-makers continue to see each other and
work together so closely, there are temptations
and urges on both sides to involve government in
standard-setting projects of all sorts. Some of
these could just as well be left to the market to
establish the standard; some actually merit a gov-
ernment role. Weighing the costs and benefits of
government taking such a role requires significant
exercises in judgment. A checklist approach will
not capture the nuances of that judgment. Study-
ing and enumerating the salient characteristics of
those processes, however, may avoid wasted time
and effort.
tant to get involved in setting a standard and
should establish a high bar for involvement on its
own initiative or on the motion of interested par-
ties. Part of the test should always be whether gov-
ernment can play a role within its competence
and whether it can achieve a quicker, sounder re-
sult than the market left alone. These cases
should be few and far between. But that general-
ization should not become a wooden rule that
keeps government out of setting standards where
the benefits are readily foreseen. Discerning such
cases will always be a matter of keen judgment.
Characteristics Suggesting Government Involvement Characteristics Suggesting Government Involvement
Might be Beneficial Might Not be Beneficial
" Atomized or comparatively small market for users of products * Prime driver of petition for government involvement is settling
that will incorporate the standard once adopted inter-industry dispute
" Need to coordinate U.S. standard with foreign countries or * Decision sought would require imposing new substantive
foreign manufacturers regulations
" Identifiable public policy externality that makes unified standard * Redundant or at odds with other public policy endeavors
desirable and makes timing urgent
" Significant prior work on the part of affected industries and * Resolvable by commercial agreement between or among
constituencies; government not starting from scratch contending parties that will not violate antitrust laws.
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